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I. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
ANTECEDENTS
A. The Deregulatory Philosophy of the 1980s
In the early 1980s the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") embarked
upon a series of deregulatory policies reflective of the
political and economic philosophy of the Reagan ad-
ministration.' That philosophy supported the dis-
mantling of specific substantive regulations in favor
of "market forces," which it was believed, were more
responsive and more efficient than a micromanaged
* Mr. Hunsaker is a partner at Putbrese & Hunsaker, Mc-
Lean, Virginia, and Adjunct Professor of Law, George Mason
University School of Law; B.A., 1966 University of California
Santa Barbara; J.D., 1969 Columbia University; M.A., 1972
Bradley University; LL.M., 1977 University of Virginia.
broadcast communications industry. All that was
needed was to remove the handcuffs from Adam
Smith's "invisible hand," and the public interest,
convenience, and necessity would be served more ef-
ficiently and economically than by any bureaucracy
in Washington.
During the 1980s, the FCC promoted not only the
growth of existing electronic media, but also the de-
velopment and profusion of new alternative media to
compete with the old. In the case of commercial ra-
dio, the Commission adopted a number of policies
which significantly proliferated the number of com-
1 To be fair, a number of deregulatory proposals, such as
the deregulation of radio, the Clear Channel Proceeding, 9
kiloHertz spacing, and Docket 80-90, were all the brainchildren
of the previous administration under Chairman Charles Ferris,























mercial radio frequencies, both AM and FM. In the
Clear Channel Proceeding,2 the protection for Class
I-A Clear Channels was reduced by 50% in order to
permit the allocation of new regional channels and
local daytime-only stations.' BC Docket 80-90, pro-
posed by the Ferris administration, but implemented
by Fowler over a three-year period, added over 700
new FM channels throughout the country, most of
which were low-powered Class "A" local channels.
These, and a number of other regulatory moves, all
adopted under the philosophy that "more is better,"
created a plethora of new audio and video services
during the 1980s."
During this period of phenomenal growth in elec-
tronic media, the bubble continued to expand. Huge
mergers took place, restructuring a large segment of
the industry. Prices paid for radio and television sta-
tions rose substantially, resulting in financing plans
completely dependent on future increases in valua-
tion rather than realistic cash flow. It became evident
that the bubble was being stretched beyond its
capacity.
B. The Altered Landscape of the 1990s
At the end of the decade, the bubble inevitably
burst. Station values plummeted, cash flows de-
creased, and business failures and bankruptcies were
common. Commercial radio stations were hit partic-
ularly hard. Some media brokers estimated that ra-
dio station values had declined by as much as 50% in
' In re Clear Channel Broadcasting in the AM Broadcast
Band, Report and Order, 78 F.C.C.2d 1345, 47 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 1099 (1980).
1 Id. para. 18. While the Fowler administration is blamed
for much of the deregulatory excesses that contributed to the eco-
nomic woes of radio, Fowler should be credited at least with the
wisdom to reject the proposed 9 kiloHertz spacing for AM radio
that was seriously urged by his predecessor, Charles Ferris.
' In re Modification of FM Broadcast Rules to Increase
Availability of Commercial FM Broadcast Assignments, Report
and Order, 48 Fed. Reg. 29,486, 53 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1550
(1983).
' In re Revision of Radio Rules and Policies, Report and
Order, 7 FCC Rcd. 2755, para. 2, 70 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 903
(1992), recon. granted in part, 7 FCC Rcd. 6387, 71 Rad. Reg.
2d (P & F) 227 (1992) [hereinafter Radio Rules and Policies
Report and Order].
' Id. para. 2. Finding that "as a direct result of this tremen-
dous market fragmentation, many participants in the radio busi-
ness are experiencing serious economic stress. More than half of
all commercial radio stations lost money in 1990, and small sta-
tions in particular have been operating near the margin of via-
bility for years." Id.
' In re Amendment of Part 73 of the Rules to Provide for an
Additional FM Station Class (Class C3) and to Increase the
two short years. By 1991, more than half of all com-
mercial radio stations were operating in the red,'
and for small market stations the percentage was
even higher.6
The FCC, seeing that it was presiding over an in-
dustry in serious economic trouble, came to realize
that its "more is better" and "diversity at any cost"
policies, like most panaceas, worked much better in
theory than in practice.
C. Initial Attempts at Damage Control
Even before the turn of the decade, the Commis-
sion began to realize that its system of mixing alloca-
tions of regional and local stations had created an
economic imbalance, making it difficult for the small
stations to compete.7 The Commission instituted a
number of policy initiatives to address these imbal-
ances in order to permit small AM and FM stations
to compete more effectively in the media
marketplace.
First, the Commission modified its rulemaking
procedures involving FM channel allotments8 mak-
ing it easier for licensees of low-power FMs to seek
and obtain an upgrade to a higher-powered class of
station, without placing their existing facilities in
jeopardy under the Ashbacker rule.' Subsequently,
the FCC adopted, by an across-the-board rulemak-
ing, a power increase for all eligible Class A FM
stations from three kilowatts effective radiated power
Maximum Transmitting Power for Class A FM Stations, Sec-
ond Report and Order, 4 FCC Rcd. 6375, 66 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 1473 (1989) [hereinafter FM Stations Second Report and
Order]. The term, "small" is used here in the sense of power
and coverage limitations. For example, Class A FM stations up
through the mid-1980s were authorized to operate at a maxi-
mum effective radiated power ("ERP") of three kilowatts and a
maximum antenna height above average terrain ("HAAT") of
100 meters (328 feet). Id. paras. 1, 15. Its "interference-free"
coverage was protected at about fifteen miles from the transmit-
ter site. Id. para. 47 n.75.
o In re Amendment of the Commission's Rules Regarding
Modification of FM Broadcast Licenses to Higher Class Co-
channel or Adjacent Channels, Report and Order, 51 Fed. Reg.
20,290, 60 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 114 (1986) [hereinafter FM
Adjacent Channels Report and Order].
9 Id. para. 2. The Commission previously had held that the
policy announced in Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S.
327 (1945) (that section 309(e) of the Communications Act re-
quires an evidentiary hearing in all cases where there are mutu-
ally exclusive applications) did not apply to FM rulemaking
proceedings where a licensee sought an upgrade on its same or
an adjacent channel. In re Application of Malrite of New York,




("ERP") to six kilowatts ERP.' In the same
rulemaking, the Commission also created a new class
of FM Station, C-3 (25 kilowatts at 100 meters
maximum HAAT), stating that the principal pur-
pose of such action was "to provide additional op-
portunities for improvement of the facilities of ex-
isting Class A FM broadcast stations."" Finally, the
Commission modified its radio duopoly rules to per-
mit common ownership of facilities with overlapping
primary service contours'2 so long as their principal
community contours'" did not overlap."'
II. REVISION OF THE RADIO OWNERSHIP
RULES
A. Decisional Antecedents: The Growth of "Local
Marketing Agreements"
Prior to the release of its Report and Order re-
laxing the radio duopoly rules in April 1992, the
FCC's Mass Media Bureau had begun responding
to the economic crisis by issuing declaratory rulings
on the legality of joint operating agreements between
two radio stations in the same market. "Time Bro-
kerage Agreements" ("TBAs") referred to an ar-
rangement, whereby one station, the time broker,
would purchase 100% of the available broadcast time
from the other station for a flat monthly fee, and act
as the programmer and sales representative for that
station. The more generic term, "Local Marketing
Agreement" ("LMA") referred to any type of ar-
rangement where one station acted as an agent for
10 FM Stations Second Report and Order, supra note 7,
para. 1.
"' In re Amendment of Part 73 of the Rules to Provide for
an Additional FM Station Class (Class C3) and to Increase the
Maximum Transmitting Power for Class A FM Stations, First
Report and Order, 4 FCC Rcd. 2792, para. 28, 66 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P & F) 338 (1989).
" "Primary service contour" is defined in the FCC's techni-
cal rules as the 1 mV/m contour for FM stations, 47 C.F.R.
§§ 73.211(b)(i), 73.215(a)(1) (1993), and the 0.5 mV/m and
2.0 mV/m contours for AM radio stations, 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.182(d) (1993).
" "Principal community contours" are defined in the FCC's
technical rules for AM stations as the distance out from the AM
station's transmitter where its ground-wave radiated energy
equals or exceeds five millivolts over one square meter of surface
area-5 mV/m. 47 C.F.R. § 73.24(i) (1993). With certain ex-
ceptions, an AM station must place a 5 mV/m or greater con-
tour over 80% of its community of license. Id. For FM stations,
the principal community contour is 3.16 mV/m (alternatively
expressed as 70 dBu). 47 C.F.R. § 73.315(a) (1993). The term
"principal community contour" is used interchangeably with
"principal city contour" or "city-grade contour."
14 In re Amendment of Section 73.3555 of the Commission's
another station in the same market with respect to
the sale of advertising time. Most of the agreements
that were made included either an option to
purchase, or a right of first refusal on the part of the
brokering station to acquire the brokered station.15
The inclusion of such a right was to protect the time
broker's long-term investment in building up the sta-
tion's ratings and sales. If the licensee could termi-
nate the agreement at any time, or sell it to a third
party, the time broker would have lost all of the
long-term benefits of its investment.
Conversely, the licensee would often have some
protection in the agreement to prevent the time bro-
ker from walking off and leaving the station in a
shambles. An early termination fee, or some guaran-
tee of payment after early termination helped to pro-
tect the licensee's economic interest. The efforts of
the time broker to protect its investment, and the
tendency of the licensee to minimize its own expense,
created a situation where violation of FCC rules and
policies concerning licensee control and responsibility
could occur. Until a ruling by the Mass Media Bu-
reau at the end of 1990, it was widely assumed that
the type of agreement such as described above, which
provided for the brokering of a substantial portion of
a station's time, would violate section 310(d) of the
Communications Act 6 and attendant FCC policies."
In March 1990, Spanish Radio Network, asked
the Commission for a declaratory ruling that a recip-
rocal time brokerage agreement between two sepa-
rately-owned spanish language stations in Florida
was illegal as a de facto duopoly and an unautho-
Rules, the Broadcast Multiple Ownership Rules, First Report
and Order, 4 FCC Rcd. 1723, para. 1, 65 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F)
1676 (1988).
15 Of course, these rights could not be exercised unless the
Commission modified its duopoly rules to permit common own-
ership of more than one radio station of the same class. Prior to
the adoption of the radio contour overlap rule, the language
found in such agreements was conditioned upon the subsequent
amendment of the multiple ownership rules by the Commission
to permit the acquisition.
le 47 U.S.C. § 310(d) (1988 & Supp. 1991).
1" The case most directly on point was a declaratory ruling
by the Commission in 1973 warning prospective purchasers of a
station to refrain from taking any managerial responsibilities at
the station prior to approval by the Commission's staff of a pro-
posed assignment of the license. In Re Request of Phoenix
Broadcasting Co. for Approval of Interim Plan for Financing
and Participation in Operations of KPHX, Phoenix, Ariz.,
Pending Determination on Application for Transfer of Control,
Request, 44 F.C.C.2d 838, 839, 29 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 187,
188-9 (1973); see also In Re Application of Fine Arts Broadcast-
ing, Inc. for Assignment of License of Station WEZL, Charles-
ton, South Carolina, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 57
F.C.C.2d 108, para. 8, 35 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1169 (1975).
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rized transfer of control. The Chief of the Mass Me-
dia Bureau issued a letter ruling denying the peti-
tion, stating that, upon review of the agreement and
the facts as presented by both sides, there had been
no unauthorized transfer of control, and that each li-
censee remained in control of its own programming,
personnel and financial affairs.18 A companion case,
Joseph A. Belisle, Esquire,19 released the same date
by the Chief of the Complaints and Investigations
Branch of the Mass Media Bureau, similarly held
that a reciprocal programming and sales arrange-
ment (termed a "network affiliation agreement") be-
tween two stations did not violate any FCC rule or
policy.
We conclude, however, that regardless of the number of
hours of piogramming KUKU-FM chooses to accept from
KWPM, Inc., the Commission approves the implementa-
tion of the affiliation agreement, as long [sic] KUKU-FM
continues to meet all of the Commission's requirements in
meeting its local service obligations, including but not lim-
ited to, retaining the right to ... cut into KWPM, Inc.'s
programming in case of an emergency; broadcasting sta-
tion identifications, maintaining a main studio within the
station's principal community contour, covering local com-
munity issues for its issues/programs list, as well as main-
taining the public inspection file.s°
Attempts were made in these rulings to distinguish
earlier Commission policy that had banned similar
arrangements."1 In light of the Mass Media Bu-
reau's later recommendations to the Commission," j
however, it is arguable that the Bureau, aware of the
worsening economic crisis, was attempting to re-
spond with the delegated authority and policy tools it
S Letter from Roy J. Stewart, Chief, MM, to Roy R.
Russo, Counsel, Spanish Radio Network, 5 FCC Rcd. 7586, 68
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1028 (1990) [hereinafter Letter from Roy
J. Stewart to Roy R. Russo].
'9 Letter from Edythe Wise, Chief, Complaints and Investi-
gations Branch, Enf. Div., MM, to Joseph A. Belisle, Esq., 5
FCC Rcd. 7585, 68 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1031 (1990).
so Id.
Si Specifically, the Russo ruling distinguished Phoenix
Broadcasting Co., supra note 17, on the grounds that the pro-
spective purchaser in that case had injected capital into the sta-
tion to keep its operations afloat, and would assume managerial
positions at station. Letter from Roy J. Stewart to Roy R.
Russo, supra note 18, at 7587, 68 Rad. Reg. 2d at 1030.
22 FCC, MASS MEDIA BUREAU, OVERVIEW OF THE RADIO
INDUSTRY (Jan. 1992) (inserted in MM Dkt. No. 91-140 (Feb.
26, 1992)) [hereinafter MMB RADIO INDUSTRY OVERVIEW].
21 Id. While the memorandum was initially intended to be
an internal working document not for public release, several
copies were "leaked" to the trade press, and the Commission de-
cided to include the memorandum in the record of rulemaking
docket MM 91-140.
21 Id. The economic crisis brought on by proliferation of
had in hand, to carve out a new policy that would
provide relief for at least some radio broadcasters.
The economic situation had worsened dramati-
cally by the end of 1991, forcing the Commission to
consider additional measures. In an internal memo-
randum28 to then Chairman Alfred Sikes, the Chief
of the Mass Media Bureau laid out the cold facts of
the economic crisis in radio, and called for a number
of changes in regulatory philosophy which would
downplay diversity in favor of survival.2 4
A key proposal for the Commission was to relax
its multiple ownership rules for radio, both nation-
ally and locally. Prior to 1991, section 73.3555 per-
mitted the national ownership of twelve AM and
twelve FM commercial radio stations;2 however, a
licensee was not permitted to own two radio stations
of the same class of service (i.e., two AM or two
FM), whose principal community contours over-
lapped, the so-called "duopoly rule." ' The Mass
Media Bureau's Radio Industry Overview discussing
fragmentation of the radio industry paved the way
for later urging that the national ownership limit be
revised to permit the ownership of a larger number
of stations nationally, as well as the modification of
the duopoly rule to permit co-ownership of more
than one radio station of the same class.2 '
On May 30, 1991, the Commission issued a No-
tice of Proposed Rule Making ("NPRM"'28 seeking
public comment on a proposal to increase the maxi-
mum number of radio stations which can be owned
nationally, and to modify the radio duopoly rule to
permit common ownership of more than one com-
mercial radio station in the same class of service (i.e.,
new FM licenses continues. At a speech to the NAB in July
1993, Acting Chairman James F. Quello told broadcasters that
he was considering imposing a freeze on the allotment of any
more FM channels. "I think in the name of diversity and com-
petition, we've licensed too many radio stations ... I never
thought I'd live to see the day when 60% of radio stations are
losing money .... I don't see where the public interest would be
served by allowing other people to go bankrupt." FCC Chair-
man Ponders Freeze on FM Stations, BROADCASTING &
CABLE, Aug. 2, 1993, at 14. As of this writing, no plan to freeze
the allotment of new FM stations has been put into effect, nor
has any rulemaking designed to improve existing service, rather
than create new FM service, been initiated.
25 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d)(1)(ii) (1993). The twelve station
limit is extended to fourteen if two stations of those fourteen are
minority-controlled. Id. § 73.3555(d)(1)(i). The multiple owner-
ship limits do not apply to noncommercial, educational FM sta-
tion licensees. Id. § 73.3555(0.
2e Id. § 73.3555(a)(1), (2).
"7 See MMB RADIO INDUSTRY OVERVIEW, supra note 22.
'o In re Revision of Radio Rules and Policies, Notice of Pro-
posed Rule Making, 6 FCC Rcd. 3275 (1991) [hereinafter Ra-
dio Rules and Policies NPRM1.
[Vol. 2
DUOPOLY WARS
AM or FM). Fifty-three individuals and groups
filed comments in response to the NPRM, and
thirty-two reply comments were filed, including the
reply comments of a number of U.S. Senators and
Congressmen."9 On April 10, 1992, the Commission
released its Report and Order."0
B. The Report and Order
With respect to the national ownership limitation,
the Commission announced that the national owner-
ship caps should be relaxed to permit an individual
or single entity to own up to thirty AM stations and
thirty FM stations nationwide.81 The Commission
justified its decision by pointing to the substantial
numerical increase in radio stations throughout the
country, as well as other forms of competing
media. 2
With respect to the local ownership, or duopoly
rule, the Commission noted the increasingly frag-
mented nature of the local radio marketplace, the ec-
onomic strain experienced by many radio broadcast-
ers, and the sizeable savings, that could stem from
joint operation of same-market radio facilities.
Three factors were emphasized in the new regula-
tions: (1) market size; (2) the number of commonly-
owned stations in the market; and (3) the audience
share resulting from a proposed acquisition."8 The
rules initially adopted divided U.S. radio markets
into four different-sized groups.
1. In markets with fewer than 15 radio stations, a single
licensee will be permitted to own up to three stations, no
more than two of which are in the same service; provided
that the owned stations represent less than 50 percent of
the [total number of commercial radio] stations in that
market. Common ownership of one AM/FM combination
29 The Commission's list of Reply Comments included the
names of U.S. Senators Lloyd Bentsen, Albert Gore, Jr., How-
ard Metzenbaum, Daniel P. Moynihan, and Paul S. Sarbanes.
Radio Rules and Policies Report and Order, supra note 5, at
2794-95, 70 Rad. Reg. 2d at 939.
80 Id. at 2755.
s' Id. para. 18.
22 Id. paras. 18, 23. The Commission stated:
The number of radio stations ... has grown dramatically
.... At the same time, the industry has witnessed a sig-
nificant increase in the number of competing audio ser-
vices delivered by cable systems, including music video of-
ferings such as MTV and VH-1 and cable network
services .... In addition, non-radio sources competing
with radio owners for audience and advertising revenues
have also multiplied, with the number of television sta-
tions growing from 883 to 1,489 since 1985 and cable
penetration increasing from 41 percent to 64 percent since
1984. [footnote omitted]
will continue to be allowed in any event.
2. In markets with 15 to 29 radio stations, a single licen-
see will be permitted to own up to two AM stations and
two FM stations, provided that the combined audience
share of [those four] stations does not exceed 25%.
3. In markets with 30 to 39 radio stations, a single licen-
see will be permitted to own up to three AM~stations and
two FM stations, provided that the combined audience
share of the [commonly owned] stations does not exceed
25%.
4. [Finally,] [i]n markets with 40 or more radio stations, a
single licensee will be permitted to own up to three AM
stations and three FM stations, provided that the com-
bined audience share of the stations does not exceed
25%.34
The Commission defined radio market as the ra-
dio metro market recognized by the Arbitron Com-
pany, Inc., a corporation in the business of measur-
ing and reporting radio and television audience
listening and viewing habits.8" Commercial radio
stations that had measurable audience listener rat-
ings in these markets would be counted in order to
determine which above-mentioned market "tier"
would define that particular market.
It was recognized that not every radio station was
in an Arbitron "rated" radio metro market. Where
the station or stations in question were located
outside any radio metro market, the definition of the
relevant market would be determined by the area en-
compassed by the principal community contours" of
the overlapping stations proposing to have common
ownership. The number of stations in the market
would then be determined by counting the number of
commercial stations whose principal community con-
tours overlapped or intersected the principal commu-
nity contours of the commonly-owned stations.87
[O]ur goal is not to introduce wholesale restructuring of
the broadcasting industry .... Rather, we intend to pro-
mote competition and diversity by modifying [the] owner-
ship rules in a manner that directly addresses the long-
term economic changes that are endemic to the radio
industry.
Id.
88 Id. para. 40.
Id.
" Arbitron breaks down its radio markets into a Metro Sur-
vey Area ("MSA") and a Total Survey Area ("TSA"). The
MSA corresponds to the boundaries of metropolitan statistical
areas designated by the United States Bureau of the Census.
The Arbitron Company, Radio County Coverage, at vi (1993
ed.).
"0 Radio Rules and Policies Report and Order, supra note 5,
para. 46.
87 Id. For example, if Station A and Station B have overlap-
ping city grade contours and Station A proposed to acquire Sta-
19941
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The audience share cap was designed as a second
check, after the numerical limitations based on mar-
ket size, to ensure that a single owner would not ac-
quire an undue concentration of control in a local
radio market."8 By necessity, the Commission had to
rely here on audience research data published by
Arbitron, which was, and remains, the only company
performing nation-wide radio audience listening be-
havior analysis on a regular, periodic basis.
The Commission acknowledged that a number of
licensees had already sought to achieve the economies
of scale inherent in joint operation by entering into
time brokerage agreements. Concern had been ex-
pressed both in the NPRM and by individual com-
menters, that the new rules should take same-market
time brokerage agreements into account and provide
additional regulation over LMAs in order to prevent
doubling up and multiplying the number of jointly
operated stations in a market by an unlimited fac-
tor. 9 Accordingly, the Commission adopted new
rules which required that whenever one station pro-
vided more than 15% of another station's program-
ming where both stations were in the same "mar-
ket,"'" the brokered station would be counted as an
attributable ownership interest for purposes of deter-
mining compliance with either the national owner-
ship or local ownership limitations.' 1 Thus, under
the new rules, a local station owner could not broker
a station in its market which it could not own under
the revised local ownership rules. Additionally, in
order to prevent an unnecessary loss of program di-
versity, the Commission prohibited same-service si-
tion B, the number of stations in the market would include not
only Stations A and B, but also all operating commercial radio
stations whose city grade contours overlap in whole or in part
with those of Stations A and B. Noncommercial educational sta-
tions, authorized but unbuilt radio stations, and stations that had
been off the air for more than six months were not to be counted
in determining market size.
8' Id. para. 48.
8" Radio Rules and Policies NPRM, supra note 28, para.
30. Under the former policy, the Commission had placed no re-
strictions whatsoever upon the number of stations in a local mar-
ket which could be jointly operated by a single licensee pursuant
to a series of time brokerage agreements. In re Petition for Issu-
ance of Policy Statement or Notice of Inquiry on Part-time Pro-
gramming, Policy Statement, 82 F.C.C.2d 107, 48 Rad. Reg 2d
(P & F) 763 (1980). For example, under the new rules, in the
largest markets, a single licensee might therefore own outright as
many as six radio stations (three AM and three FM), Radio
Rules and Policies Report and Order, supra note 5, para. 40, so
long as their combined audience share did not exceed 25%, but
could also time broker any number of additional stations with no
restriction on whether the combined audience share of the
brokered stations, when added to the combined share of the com-
monly owned stations exceeded 40%, 50%, 75% or more. Thus,
mulcasting, whether co-owned or owned and
brokered in the same market.
42
C. The Reconsideration Order
The Report and Order drew intense criticism
from several quarters, not the least of which was the
office of Commissioner Andrew C. Barrett, who par-
tially dissented on the complicated market-tier ap-
proach to relaxing the duopoly rule, pointing to its
likely impact on small group owners, independent
owners, and new entrants in the local radio markets.
Why should small radio players and new entrants be pe-
nalized for prior decisions the Commission made to allo-
cate nearly 700 new FM radio stations in Docket 80-90,
or add as many AM stations as possible? While I agree
with the general view that allocating more stations during
the 1980s was not necessarily better for radio industry ec-
onomics, I do not agree that the Commission must now
"cut off" new entrants and small players at the knees in
order to reshuffle the economics of the radio industry. Yet,
the cumulative effect of the new radio ownership rules has
the potential to do just that .... The beneficiaries of such
shorter-term activities will be station brokerage compa-
nies, a few large group owners, and the lawyers repre-
senting these entities. The likely losers from this action
will be small radio group owners, stand alone radio sta-
tion licensees, small market radio station licensees, new
entrants, and last, but not least, the listening public.'"
Certain members of Congress also vocally criticized
the Commission's decision and warned that appro-
priations for FCC activities might be in jeopardy un-
less the rules were modified.4" The Commission re-
the Commission decided to impute "ownership" to any station in
the market that brokered 15% or more of another station's pro-
gramming in the same market. Id. para. 65.
0 Radio Rules and Policies Report and Order, supra note 5,
para. 12. In this context, the Commission defined "market" by
reference to the area of overlap of the principal community con-
tours of the subject stations. Id. para. 46.
41 Id. para. 65. The Commission observed that time broker-
age agreements involving stations licensed to different markets
raised little public interest concern. "[Ilndeed, they can be diffi-
cult to distinguish from network affiliation agreements, of which
the Commission has long approved." Id. para. 64 n.124.
4 Id. para. 57. The limited nonduplication rule prohibited
same-service stations from duplicating each other's programming
by more than 25% if their city grade contours overlapped each
other, and the overlapped area constituted 50% or more of the
principal community service area of either station. Id. para. 66.
'" Id. at 2810, 70 Rad. Reg. 2d at 924 (statement of Comm'r
Andrew Barrett).
44 Barrett Abstains: Dissent Likely: FCC Ups Radio Maxi-
mum to 30 AMs and 30 FMs, Relaxes Duopoly Rule, COMM.
DAILY, Mar. 13, 1992, at 1; Randy Sukow, Sikes Questioned on
New Radio Limits, BROADCASTING, Mar. 30, 1992, at 40.
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leased a Reconsideration Order on September 4,
1993, in response to a number of petitions for recon-
sideration or clarification of the new rules and to ap-
pease congressional committees charged with over-
sight of FCC activities.'
5
1. Tightening of National Ownership Limitations
In response to Congressional criticism that the
Commission had been too liberal in expanding the
cap on national ownership from 12-12-12 to 30-30-
12, the Commission backpedalled, 4" and set the na-
tional ownership limit at 18 AM and 18 FM sta-
tions, which would increase in two years following
the effective date of the Reconsideration Order, to 20
and 20."' In addition, the Commission stated it
would permit an attributable," but not controlling"
interest in three additional stations of each class of
service, where those three additional AM and FM
stations were either minority controlled,50 or con-
trolled by small businesses."
While cutting back on the number of AM and
FM stations that may be owned by a common group
nationally seemed to appease Congress, the Commis-
sion's retrenching of the national ownership limita-
tion had little impact on the industry. Only a few
, In re Revision of Radio Rules and Policies, Memorandum
Opinion and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rule Mak-
ing, 7 FCC Rcd. 6387, 6406, 71 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 227, 230
(1992) [hereinafter Radio Rules and Policies Reconsideration
Order]. The Commission identified twenty separate petitions for
reconsideration, some filed jointly, that had been filed by indus-
try owners, individuals, law firms and public interest groups, in-
cluding Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., Cox Enterprises, Jacor Com-
munications, National Association of Black Owned Broadcasters,
National Black Media Coalition, National Association of Broad-
casters, Telecommunications Research and Action Council, and
Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ.
46 In a separate statement accompanying the Radio Rules
and Policies Reconsideration Order, Chairman Alfred C. Sikes
candidly admitted:
The large reduction (i.e., from 30 AM and 30 FM in the
first Report and Order to 18 AM and 18 FM in the Re-
consideration Order) in the total number of stations that
one entity can own nationwide is a simple function of the
fact that we live in a city of shared power. We were asked
by key members of Congress to reduce the limit and we
did.
Id. at 6409, 71 Rad. Reg. at 246 (statement of Chairman Alfred
C. Sikes).
"I Id. para. 14.
I d. The Commission's policies concerning what is or is
not an "attributable" ownership interest in a broadcast licensee
are explained in notes to 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (1993). In gen-
eral, an attributable interest is defined as any ownership interest
which constitutes five percent or greater of the voting control of
the broadcast licensee or, if the entity is a corporation, the hold-
licensees at the time had the full complement of
twelve AM and twelve FM stations, and today, more
than eighteen months after the effective date5 of
the Reconsideration Order, only one group owner-
Clear Channel Communications-has acquired a
full complement of thirty-six radio stations."
2. Revised Definition of Radio "Market"
The more significant change in the Reconsidera-
tion Order was the revision of the overly complex
definition of a local radio market used in the Report
and Order. In response to significant criticism from
the industry, the Commission abandoned the four-
tiered definition for a more manageable, two-tier
definition of "small" and "large" radio markets."
"Market," whether large or small, was defined in
terms of the number of principal community con-
tours of commercial radio stations that overlapped
with the stations which were the subject of the duop-
oly showing.55 "Small markets" were those that con-
sisted of fourteen or fewer such stations. In these
markets, a party may now own an attributable inter-
est in no more than three stations, no more than two
of which are in the same class of service (i.e., AM or
FM). One additional limitation was imposed: the
ing of office or directorship in the corporation, whether or not
accompanied by the holding of any equitable ownership interest.
Thus, for purposes of determining compliance with the Commis-
sion's broadcast multiple ownership policies, with limited excep-
tions, a .5% voting interest or membership on the board of direc-
tors is counted the same as a 100% voting interest. 47 C.F.R.
§ 73.3555, NOTES 2(a), (h) (1993).
"' For purposes of this provision, controlling interest is de-
fined as 50% ("negative control") or greater ("positive control").
See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d)(3)(iii) (1993); but see NOTE 1, fol-
lowing § 73.3555(Q.
50 The Commission's definition of "minority" is "Black,
Hispanic, American Indian, Alaska Native, Asian and Pacific
Islander." 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d)(3)(iv) (1993). A "minority
controlled" licensee is one in which greater than 50% of the vot-
ing control of the licensee is held by persons belonging to one or
more minority groups. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d)(3)(iii) (1993).
"' The Commission defined "small business" as a business
which, at the time of application to the Commission, had annual
revenues of less than $500,000 and total assets of less than
$1,000,000. Radio Rules and Policies Reconsideration Order,
supra note 45, para. 19.
52 Id. para. 74; see In re Revision of Radio Rules and Poli-
cies, Final Order, 57 Fed. Reg. 42,701, 42,704 (1992).
" Peter Viles, Clear Channel Plan Would Bypass FCC
Ownership Limit, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Nov. 29, 1993, at
18.
" Radio Rules and Policies Reconsideration Order, supra
note 45, para. 32.
55 Id. para. 39.
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three-station combination must constitute less than
50% of the commercial radio stations in that small
market.56 For example, if an engineering study de-
termined that a small market consisted of seven or
more commercial radio stations, a party could own
three of them and still meet the rule. However, if
there were only six commercial radio stations in the
market, the rules would not permit either the owner-
ship of three stations or the time brokerage of one by
an owner of two existing stations, since three stations
constituted 50% of the number of the stations in the
market.
"Large markets" were those radio markets with
fifteen or more commercial radio stations." If a li-
censee were part of a large market, it could own up
to four stations, provided that no more than two
were AM and two were FM. Again, a further re-
striction was imposed pertaining to the combined
market share of the three or four stations." The
Commission continued to rely on audience listening
behavior statistics as calculated by a professional au-
dience research service. Where the proposed acquisi-
tion exceeded a combined audience share of 25%, the
Commission considered it prima facie evidence that
the proposed acquisition would not be in the public
interest, due to the resulting concentration of control
in the market."9
3. Use of Audience Rating Data as a Determinant
of Market Power
The Commission rejected the arguments of a
number of petitioners to abandon the use of audience
share data as a determinant of compliance with the
expanded local ownership rules. Many had argued
Id. para. 32.
Id. Again, the number of commercial radio stations in the
market was to be determined by the calculation of the principal
community contours of the subject stations and those of each sta-
tion whose principal community contour intersected that of one
or more of the subject stations. Id. para. 39.
88 Id. para. 32.
I d. para. 55.
'0 Id. para. 47.
61 Id. para. 48. In the Report and Order, the Commission
had indicated that in "extreme cases" it could require divesti-
ture, having not given up its plenipotentiary power to regulate in
the public interest. While not specifically saying so, the Commis-
sion noted that it would "carefully review" the circumstances
through which any station group reached or exceeded a 40%
market share. Radio Rules and Policies Report and Order,
supra note 5, para. 56 n.109.
"6 Radio Rules and Policies Reconsideration Order, supra
note 45, para. 52 n.71.
ea BROADCASTING AND CABLE MARKETPLACE 1992, at E-2
that such audience share data was inherently unsuit-
able for purposes of analyzing market power. The
Commission contended, however, that use of audi-
ence data was a more effective way of accounting for
diversity and competition in a particular market than
by reference to the technical facilities of the stations
involved, which assumed further, that superior tech-
nical facilities would result in a greater market
share.60 At the same time, the Commission made
clear that the 25% benchmark was not intended to
freeze a combination's market share at a particular
level, or to require divestiture of existing three or
four station combinations if they later reached that
level: "[algain, our goal is to promote robust compe-
tition, and we do not believe that penalizing enter-
prises that grow into stronger competitors is consis-
tent with this objective." 6
Other problems inherent in the use of Arbitron
data also were addressed. First, the Commission ac-
knowledged that not all radio markets (now exclu-
sively defined by the use of overlapping principal
community contours), were within an Arbitron-rated
radio metro market. 62 In 1992, Arbitron had identi-
fied 261 Radio Metro Markets, ranging in size from
first-ranked New York with an age 12 and older
population of 14,024,700, to 261st-ranked Minot,
North Dakota (12+ population 46,000). 6' Where a
proposed duopoly fell outside of a rated market or
covered more than one rated market, the use of
county-by-county statistics, also collected and pub-
lished by Arbitron, was to be used.64 In the latter
case, the method for deriving a single "market
share" required the weighting of each affected sta-
tion's county shares to derive an average.65
The Commission also dealt with the question of
through E-8.
" Radio Rules and Policies Reconsideration Order, supra
note 45, para. 53.
'0 Id. para. 53 n.73. The Commission gave an lengthy ex-
ample involving two stations and three counties. The total popu-
lation of the three counties was first determined, and then a
weighting factor applied to each county based upon its popula-
tion as a percentage of the total. That percentage was then ap-
plied to the Arbitron audience share for that county, and finally
all of the weighted shares were added together. Id. The order
did not specify whether the population to be counted was the
U.S. Census population or the Arbitron AQH 12+ population.
In a private letter ruling on a cross-interest waiver request,
which involved a county-by-county showing under the new
rules, the legal staff of the Audio Services Division advised that
the Arbitron AQH 12+ population for each county, being the
more conservative number, should be used in calculating the
weighted audience share. Letter from Larry D. Eads, Chief, Au-




whether alternative showings might be used where
Arbitron data was either not available, prohibitively
expensive to obtain, or contained statistical anoma-
lies that gave a distorted picture of market power.66
Specifically, the FCC included a special Note in sec-
tion 73.3555, which provided:
NOTE: When evaluating audience share evidence submit-
ted under Section 73.3555(a)(1)(ii), the Commission will
consider data that eliminates statistical anomalies, pro-
vides a better focused survey area or includes revenue data
or other relevant information. Where applicants certify
that they do not have readily available audience share
data, they may substitute other information that can serve
as a proxy for such data. See Memorandum Opinion and
Order in MM Docket No. 91-140, FCC 92-361 (released
Sept. 4, 1992).1
7
The inclusion of such an exception was intended to
meet objections that exclusive reliance on Arbitron
audience research data was inadvisable. The Com-
mission recognized several situations where alterna-
tive showings might be entertained:
We acknowledge that there may be situations where ap-
plicants can provide data that eliminates statistical anoma-
lies, provides a better focused survey area or includes rev-
enue data or other information proving that excessive
concentration will not result. Thus, for example, a special
survey with a larger sample size could eliminate statistical
anomalies. Survey data averaged over a number of survey
periods may be appropriately qualified to be used as the
practical equivalent of a more recent survey with a larger
sample size. Audience data may be available, for example
by the extraction of zip code area data, that eliminates
anomalies resulting from unusual geographical features
associated with the area served by the stations in question.
We will thus not preclude applicants from relying on such
alternative data."
The Commission reserved to itself, however, the au-
thority to rule on the acceptability of alternative
showing data except where it could be clearly and
unambiguously resolved by the staff.69
" Radio Rules and Policies Reconsideration Order, supra
note 45, paras. 56-57.
67 Id. para. 56 (NOTE follows 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(a)(1)(ii)
(1993)).
"a Id. The Commission went on to observe that it would also
consider alternative data where a showing had been made that
the cost of acquiring it was prohibitive, or where there were a
large number of stations in the market and the stations propos-
ing to join were low power AM or FM. Id. para. 58.
09 Id. para. 58 n.78. Experience to date suggests that the
staff has interpreted this reservation as absolute, and has consist-
D. Restrictions on Time Brokerage Agreements
and Other Joint Ventures
The Commission reaffirmed its rules on time bro-
kerage agreements and other joint ventures, declining
to modify them in any material way.7 0 Further clari-
fication of the new rules was provided, however. Of
particular importance to prospective buyers, was the
clarification that if two stations in the same market
enter into a time brokerage agreement, and their
combined audience share subsequently surpasses
25%, one station may not purchase the other. How-
ever, a time brokerage agreement entered into before
September 16, 1992 (the effective date of the Recon-
sideration Order) would not have to be terminated
early."' Brokered stations that were being same-ser-
vice simulcasted would be required to come into
compliance with the rule within one year of the ef-
fective date.7" Finally, the Commission required that
same market time brokerage agreements between
stations be filed with the Commission and kept in
each station's public inspection file.73
III. CASE STUDIES
While the process of rulemaking, comments, re-
consideration petitions, and further comments and
replies crystallized a number of issues involving the
new rules, the resulting Reconsideration Order by no
means eliminated the need for further evaluation and
interpretation. As a number of stations in medium
and larger markets began to seek permanent affilia-
tions in the form of acquisitions rather than time
brokerage agreements, other radio licensees in those
same markets sought to oppose these consolida-
tions-even if those objectors had already made an
affiliation of their own. The stage was set for a series
of "duopoly wars," where the "haves" attempted,
through litigation at the FCC, to prevent the "have-
nots" from acquiring a greater market share. The
remainder of this Article is devoted to an examina-
tion of issues raised in four case studies and to an
assessment of the effectiveness of the local radio
ently rejected all alternative showings. See infra, Part IV.A and
accompanying text.
70 Radio Rules and Policies Reconsideration Order, supra
note 45, paras. 63-65.
71 Id. para. 66.
72 Id.
71 Id. para. 67. This included pre-existing agreements, as
well as agreements entered into after the effective date of the
Reconsideration Order. Confidential financial information con-
cerning the time brokerage fee, and other charges are permitted
to be redacted from public file copies. Id.
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ownership rule changes in meeting the economic
challenges faced by commercial radio in the 1990s.
A. Ratings in Motion - The Charleston, West Vir-
ginia Case"'
As defined by Arbitron in 1992, Charleston, West
Virginia, was the 151st-ranked radio metro mar-
ket.75 The Charleston Metropolitan Statistical Area
("MSA") consisted of the counties of Kanawha and
Putnam, and according to Arbitron, had a popula-
tion of 209,200 in 1992. The Total Service Area
("TSA") population, which included adjacent coun-
ties, was 675,000 in 1992.7 The number of commer-
cial radio stations listed in the Charleston MSA
were eight AMs and eight FMs." Arbitron pub-
lishes audience ratings data for the Charleston metro
twice a year, based upon a six-week survey period
during the fall and spring.
Bristol Broadcasting Company, Inc. ("Bristol")
owned WQBE AM-FM in Charleston, West Vir-
ginia, and had a time brokerage agreement with
WKAZ-FM, in Miami, West Virginia (part of the
Charleston MSA). With its country and western
music format, Bristol had dominated the Charleston
MSA with a 36% or greater audience share for a
number of, years.78 In the spring of 1992, the com-
bined audience share for WQBE AM-FM and
WKAZ-FM reached 43.1%.71
In the summer of 1992, West Virginia Radio Cor-
poration of Charleston ("West VA Radio"), ac-
" In re Application of Franklin Communications Partners,
L.P., Assignor, and West Virginia Radio Corporation of
Charleston, Assignee, for Assignment of Licenses of
WCAW(AM)/WVAF-FM Charleston, West Virginia, Memo-
randum Opinion and Order, 8 FCC Rcd. 4909 (1993) [hereinaf-
ter Franklin Communications MO&O]. The author represented
West Virginia Radio Corporation of Charleston ("West VA Ra-
dio"), the proposed assignee in this case.
71 BROADCASTING AND CABLE MARKET PLACE 1992, at E-
3.
76 Id.
77 Id. However, as noted below, when utilizing the Commis-
sion's principal city contour overlap methodology for determin-
ing market size, a much larger number of stations-in the in-
stant case, 22 FM's and 14 AM's, 36 in all-are included in the
Charleston "market."
78 "Source Spring 1992 Arbitron Radio Local Market Re-
port for Charleston, WV Metro Survey Area. Estimates are
12+ Average Quarter Hour persons Share for Mon-Sun, 6A-
12Mid. Copyright, © 1992 The Arbitron Company. Estimates
subject to the limitations stated in the report." Used with per-
mission, and submitted to the FCC in connection with the
Charleston, West Virginia duopoly case.
79 Id.
quired WCHS(AM) and WVNS(FM), both li-
censed to Charleston."0 A few weeks later, West VA
Radio changed the call letters of WVNS to WKWS
and the music format to country in an attempt to
directly challenge Bristol's dominant position." After
the release of the Reconsideration Order, West VA
Radio entered into negotiations with Franklin Com-
munications Partners, LP, ("Franklin") the licensee
of WCAW(AM) and WVAF(FM), also licensed to
Charleston, for the purchase of those stations as
well. A contract for purchase and sale of the stations
was signed on December 24, 1992, and an applica-
tion for FCC consent was filed on December 30,
1992.82 Included in the application was a "duopoly
showing," purporting to demonstrate compliance
with the newly amended section 73.3555(a)(1) of the
FCC's rules. 3
At the time the Franklin application was filed, the
most recent Arbitron available data for the four-sta-
tion combination was the Spring 1992 Report, which
showed a combined audience share of 18.6% for the
four stations."' Three weeks after the Franklin ap-
plication was filed, Arbitron released the Fall 1992
Report, which showed that the combined share for
WCHS-WKWS and WCAW-WVAF had risen to
27.5%, while Bristol's combined share had declined
from a high of 43.1% in the Spring 1992 Report to
36.1%. 6' Some of that drop was no doubt attributa-
ble to West VA Radio's change of format on its ex-
isting FM, WKWS, to compete directly with
WQBE AM-FM.
On February 10, 1993, Bristol filed a petition to
8O See FCC, Broadcast Actions (Rpt. No. 21395), Public
Notice, June 5, 1992, at 11 (granting BAL-920331EC and
BAPLH-920331ED on June 1, 1992).
8' Interview with Dale B. Miller, President of West VA Ra-
dio, Feb. 20, 1992.
" Application of Franklin Communications Partners, L.P.,
for Consent to Assignment of Broadcast Station, in File Nos.
BAL-921230EA and BALH-921230EB (June 18, 1993) [here-
inafter Franklin Application].
83 Id. at Ex. C.
s4 "Source Spring 1992 Arbitron Radio Local Market Re-
port for Charleston, WV Metro Survey Area. Estimates are
12+ Average Quarter Hour persons Share for Mon-Sun, 6A-
12Mid. Copyright, ¢ 1992 The Arbitron Company. Estimates
subject to the limitations stated in the report." Used with per-
mission, and submitted to the FCC in connection with the
Charleston, West Virginia duopoly case.
" "Source Fall 1992 Arbitron Radio Local Market Report
for Charleston, WV Metro Survey Area. Estimates are 12+ Av-
erage Quarter Hour persons Share for Mon-Sun, 6A-12Mid.
Copyright, © 1992 The Arbitron Company. Estimates subject to
the limitations stated in the report." Used with permission, and




deny the sale, contending that the Fall 1992 Report,
released after the filing of the Franklin application,
showed that the four-station combination share ex-
ceeded the 25% cap imposed by the Commission
when it revised its local ownership rules for radio,
and thus, the application must be denied."' Bristol
based its contention by equivocating on the word
"data." Quoting from the Report and Order, Bristol
admitted that "the relevant share data for the market
"will be determined with reference to the most re-
cent audience data for the market at the time [the]
application is filed.' " However, Bristol argued that
because the fall 1992 audience survey period (Sep-
tember 24 to December 16, 1992) had passed, the
most recent data at the time Franklin filed its De-
cember 30, 1992 application was the data collected
during that survey period. Bristol argued further
that the language of the rule made no mention of the
data being published, and also that the language
spoke about a grant of the application resulting in a
combined audience share exceeding 25%."
Finally, Bristol contended that the rule required
the staff to deny, and even set aside a previously
granted duopoly application up to the point of con-
summation of the transaction, if more recent audi-
ence survey data showing a combined share exceed-
ing the 25% cap were to be made available or
otherwise come into existence prior to the date of
such consummation.
89
In a Joint Opposition to Petition to Deny, the
seller, Franklin, and, the buyer, West VA Radio re-
sponded to the Bristol Petition by contending that
the pertinent ratings at the time the application was
filed formed the basis for eligibility, citing to the
same language in the Report and Order as did Bris-
tol, and under that standard, the application was
grantable. ° West VA Radio further pointed out that
Bristol's claim that the fall 1992 data was in any
" Franklin Application, supra note 82; Petition to Deny of
Bristol Broadcasting Company, Inc., 3-4 (petition date Feb. 10,
1993) [hereinafter Bristol Petition].
87 Bristol Petition, supra note 86, at 4 (citing to 7 FCC Rcd.
at 2782).
I d. at 4.
8 Id. at 5-6.
90 Franklin Application, supra note 82; Joint Opposition to
Petition to Deny of Franklin Communications Partners, L.P.,
and West Virginia Radio Corporation 6 (joint opposition date
Feb. 24, 1993) [hereinafter Joint Opposition].
9' Joint Opposition, supra note 90, at 6-7.
S Id. at 9-10; see Radio Rules and Policies Reconsideration
Order, supra note 45, paras. 48-49.
Joint Opposition, supra note 90, at 10.
Id. at 5, 14. In the midst of this controversy, the station
sense available at the time of the application was dis-
ingenuous, and included a letter from Arbitron stat-
ing that the Fall 1992 Report for Charleston was re-
leased on January 21, 1993, and the earliest anyone
had been advised of the results of the fall survey was
two days earlier, January 19, 1993, when subscrib-
ers in the market were advised by telephone. 91
With respect to Bristol's argument that subse-
quent data could undo a previously eligible combina-
tion, West VA Radio disagreed, arguing that the
Commission never intended such a result, and cited
to the Reconsideration Order where the Commission
had indicated, in a number of places, that the 25%
cap would not be used to require divestiture or
breakup of three or four station combinations whose
ratings increased above 25%.9" West VA Radio also
pointed out that such an interpretation would be
prejudicial where the applying stations in question
had exchanged confidential competitive information
as well as an administrative nightmare for the Com-
mission staff to deal with "on again, off again"
deals.93 West VA Radio also raised a "clean hands"
issue with respect to Bristol, providing the Commis-
sion with the information on Bristol's own three-way
combination, which had at one time exceeded the
40% mark, and concluded that the public interest
would be better served by permitting West VA Ra-
dio to compete with Bristol on a level playing field.94
After' lengthy consideration, the Mass Media Bu-
reau Staff decided to refer the matter to the full
Commission, rather than deciding the question on
delegated authority. A draft ruling was circulated
among the Commissioners, and subsequently re-
drafted to meet the concerns of one or more of them.
On July 14, 1993 the Commission released a Memo-
randum Opinion and Order granting the assignment
application and rejecting Bristol's petition to deny."
In approving the proposed combination, the Coin-
manager for WQBE wrote a letter to the FCC protesting the
sale without identifying his position or the fact that he had once
worked for West VA Radio, who fired him after it purchased
WCHS-WVNS. Apparently believing that congressional clout
was needed, WQBE's manager also wrote Senator Robert C.
Byrd, and asked him to contact the Commission on WQBE's
behalf. Because of WQBE's filing of its petition to deny, the
proceeding had become "restricted," and thus, the Senator's let-
ter on behalf of the constituent constituted an x parte presenta-
tion prohibited by the Commission's rules. The Secretary of the
FCC wrote back to the Senator explaining the situation and
serving copies of the correspondence on all parties. This set off a
second series of pleadings in response to the ex parte
communication.
15 Franklin Communications MO&O, supra note 74.
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mission admitted that the rule as revised by the Re-
consideration Order was ambiguous with respect to
the currency of the data to be used in the showing,
due to the inclusion of a provision for alternative
showings.
[Blecause the rule was modified to provide for the use of
alternative data and additional showings, the text of Sec-
tion 73.3555(a)(3)(iii) adopted in the [Reconsideration
Order], did not include the reference to "the most recent
published audience share available at the time that the ap-
plication is filed with the Commission." This was evi-
dently a rule drafting error because when Arbitron or
other similar independent survey data are submitted, we
intended to continue to evaluate audience share based on
the most recent published survey data available at the
time that the application is filed. Nothing in the [Recon-
sideration Order] indicates a different intention."
With respect to Bristol's contention that the Com-
mission and staff were obliged to consider new data
published after the filing but before the grant of an
application, the Commission noted that the 25% cap
was a secondary screening device, an additional safe-
guard, intended to strike a balance between permit-
ting the radio industry to take advantage of econo-
mies of scale and preventing undue concentration of
control. Because the 25% audience share benchmark
was likely more restrictive than antitrust concerns
would mandate,
[u]nder these circumstances, we believe that it is not inap-
propriate or inconsistent with our policies to evaluate au-
dience share in light of the most recent published survey
data available at the time the application is filed, rather
than requiring an evaluation based on the very latest data
from Arbitron or another ratings service that may become
available during the pendency of an application.
7
The Commission further explained that it had
"intended for the audience share measure to be rela-
tively simple to ascertain and demonstrate, consistent
with [its] objective to craft a rule that would be as
simple to apply as possible."' 8 In addition, fairness
dictated that the parties to an application who have
committed resources in time and money to seek
Commission approval of the transaction, not be sub-
jected to continuing uncertainty throughout the ap-
" Id. para. 10.
7 Id. para. 9. The Commission defined "published" in the
context of audience survey data, to mean the time when the data
"is officially released by the ratings service in written form, or in
another widely legible form such as a computer disk." Id. para.
8 n.6.
98 Id. para. 11.
" Id.
00Id. para. 12.
plication process as a result of the release of subse-
quent audience share data after the filing of the
application. Such a policy would also subject the
Commission's own resources to unnecessary adminis-
trative cost and delay.'
9
Therefore, we will not generally require applicants to
amend their applications, pursuant to 47 CFR § 1.65, to
report changes in audience share based upon data which
is published or becomes available after the application is
filed . . . . In this regard, we believe the benefits to be
gained by affording applicants certainty and reducing
their potential application costs, as well as minimizing the
processing burdens on the Commission, outweigh any pro-
bative value of data which is published or becomes availa-
ble after the application is filed. 1
The Commission did caution, however, that it would
not foreclose the possibility of denying a proposed
combination that at the time of filing was under the
25% cap if, during the pendency of the application,
newer data is brought to its attention that shows the
combined share significantly exceeds the 25% share
cap.101 While not expressly saying so, the Commis-
sion once again referred to the 40% "ceiling" it had
stated in the Report and Order might cause it to or-
der a divestiture of a previously granted combina-
tion. 10' In the Charleston case, however, the Com-
mission specifically found that a post-filing increase
from 18.6% to 27.5% was not "sufficiently significant
to raise a substantial and material question of
fact."10
o
B. In Search of Anomalies, I - The Richmond,
Virginia Case
In another capital city, a similar battle was waged
over the question of when alternative data, or in this
case, trends data, might be used in connection with
rebutting a showing of compliance with section
3.3555(a)(1). ' Clear Channel Radio Licenses, Inc.
("Clear Channel"), which held the licenses of
WRVA(AM) and WRVQ(FM) in Richmond, Vir-
ginia, sought Commission approval on the acquisi-
tion of two additional stations, WRNL(AM) and
WRXL(FM), also licensed to Richmond. 5 Clear
101 Id.
102 Id. para. 12 n.7.
1oa Id. para. 13. The Commission also dismissed the ex parte
objections filed by WQBE's station manager as irrelevant, un-
supported and/or speculative. Id. para. 14.
104 Letter from Larry D. Eads, Chief, Audio Services Divi-
sion to Marvin Rosenberg, Esq., 8 FCC Rcd. 5568, 5568 (1993)




Channel submitted an exhibit establishing that the
majority of overlap of the four stations occurred in
the Richmond, Virginia Radio Metro Market, that
there were twenty-three other stations whose princi-
pal community contours overlapped those of the sub-
ject stations, and that the combined audience share
for the four stations, based upon the Fall 1992 Arbi-
tron Report for Richmond, was 24.7%.06
During the public comment period, a petition to
deny the application was filed by a competitor in the
market, Four Seasons Communications Partners,
L.P. ("Four Seasons"), the parent company of
WMXB License Partnership, licensee of WMXB
(FM), in Richmond. Four Seasons alleged that grant
of the application would lead to an undue concentra-
tion of local control in the Richmond market by
Clear Channel because historically, the combined
share of the four stations had always exceed 25%.
The fall 1992 data was thus "anomalous" and
unreliable.
In support of its first contention, Four Seasons
submitted a statement by its program director alleg-
ing that the Fall 1992 Report was the first Arbitron
ratings survey since 1986 in which the four stations
in question had an audience share of less than 25%,
and that the average of the four quarterly reports in
1992 was 25.9%.107
Four Seasons also submitted the declaration of a
former employee of WRVQ, who alleged that after
Clear Channel purchased that station in June of
1992, no budget was set aside for station promotions,
and that little, if any promotional activity was un-
dertaken by Clear Channel for that station." 8 Four
Seasons contended that this evidence proved that
Clear Channel was deliberating sabotaging its own
audience ratings in order to get them down enough
to qualify for the proposed duopoly.1 9
Given this evidence, Four Seasons argued that the
Commission should consider the trends data over the
entire year or several years, as a better indicator of
the combination's real market power, and that, given
that the combined share had historically exceeded
25% in all but the fall quarter of 1992 when the ap-
plication was submitted, the application should be
denied. Four Seasons cited to the Reconsideration
106 Id.
107 Id. Arbitron publishes quarterly updates of audience rat-
ings for the Richmond market. According to Four Seasons, the
4-station combined shares for the four quarters of 1992 were
25.8%, 26.5%, 26.6% and 24.7%, respectively. Id. at 5568 n.3.
108 Id. at 5568.
100 Id. at 5569. Another issue raised by Four Seasons was
that Clear Channel had illegally assumed control of WRNL-
Order in MM Docket 91-140, as authority for the
proposition that trends data may be used in such in-
stances where, as here, "single ratings period does
not accurately measure audience share." 10 It also
argued that only the Commission, not the staff, could
grant the application, because the Commission had
exclusively reserved for itself the right to review ap-
plications where alternate evidence was submitted.
In response, Clear Channel, while not disputing
the audience share data for other quarters submitted
by Four Seasons, denied the allegation concerning
the decrease in WRVQ's promotion budget, stating
that it increased the promotional budget by over 31%
during the first six months that it owned WRVQ.
Clear Channel also stated that it had followed the
rule by submitting the most recent audience share
data available from Arbitron with its application,
and that to permit or require the use of data from
previous ratings periods would permit applicants to
"cherry-pick" the data they would use, and inject a
level of uncertainty into the application process. Fi-
nally, Clear Channel contended that the provision in
the rules and accompanying policy statement permit-
ting the use of alternative data was meant to benefit
the applicants (not objectors) by permitting them to
introduce other data when the combined ratings
share was in excess of 25% due to an anomaly."'
Because there was no anomaly, the 24.7% not being
a sizeable drop from the previous ratings period as
presented by Four Seasons, the use of trends data
was not required.
The Commission staff, in granting the application,
relied heavily on the Commission's recent pro-
nouncements in the Charleston case. Because Clear
Channel had presented a prima facie case of compli-
ance with the contour overlap rule, the burden of
proof was on the objector, Four Seasons, to rebut the
presumption of eligibility thus derived. Four Seasons
had not presented any specific evidence of deliberate
ratings manipulation by Clear Channel, and Clear
Channel had submitted specific evidence to the con-
trary. The allegation that the combined share had
never fallen below 25% since 1986 had not been sup-
ported with any documentary evidence by Four Sea-
sons. Moreover, the slight decline of the fall 1992
WRXL pursuant to a time brokerage agreement that had not
been submitted to the Commission. This separate issue was re-
solved in favor the applicants and will not be dealt with here.
110 Id. at 5568 (citing Memorandum Opinion and Order
and Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making in MM Dkt. No.
91-140, 7 FCC Rcd. 6387, 6398 n.71 (1992)).
III Id. at 5569.
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combined share was not a sizeable drop from previ-
ous ratings periods so as to regard it as either unreli-
able or anomalous.112
Finally, the staff ruled that while the rules per-
mitted the use of data averaged over a number of
survey periods in certain situations, a party wishing
to offer such evidence must first establish that such
data eliminates statistical anomalies in the generally
accepted and available audience research data."'
The effect of the staff ruling in the Richmond case
seemed to preclude the use of any alternative show-
ings except those that establish that Arbitron made a
statistical error in calculating the individual station
audience ratings from the raw data collected in the
field, or that the applicant made an error in combin-
ing that data for the stations and period in question.
In the former situation, it is doubtful whether an ap-
plicant or objector could ever prove errors made in-
ternally by Arbitron, since access to the raw data
would be limited. As to the latter situation, the like-
lihood of pure mathematical errors in adding the
shares of three or four stations seems remote, and
easily corrected. Neither situation is likely to lead to
the use, or consideration by the staff, of alternative
audience share data. Thus, while the Commission
had previously held out a specific hope to partici-
pants in the rulemaking proceeding that alternative
showings would be accepted, the Richmond case sug-
gests that the staff does not want to open up the door
to the use of such showings.1"
C. In Search of Anomalies, II - The Jonesboro,
Arkansas Case
If any doubts remained following the Richmond
case that alternative data would not normally be ac-
cepted, these were eliminated by an October 25,
1993, ruling by the Commission itself on a case with
112 Id. at 5570. The staff noted that the newly available first
quarter data, which was released after the filing of the applica-
tion, showed a further drop in combined share to 22.6%. While
not relying on the later evidence (cf Franklin Communications
MO&O, supra note 74), the staff observed that it did support its
conclusion that the fall 1992 data was not anomalous.
"' Letter from Larry D. Eads to Marvin Rosenberg, supra
note 104, at 5570. As to Four Seasons' challenge to the staff's
authority to rule adversely on its petition, the staff held that no
bona fide issue of compliance with the 25% cap had been
presented. Id.
11. Id. While the staff was silent as to the reasoning behind
this policy, the general acceptability of alternative data adds un-
necessarily to the complexity of the case and creates opportuni-
ties for additional litigation and nitpicking by would-be objectors
to a proposed combination, delaying the implementation of what
facts just the reverse of Richmond. In Patteson
Brothers," ' an uncontested case, the Commission
was asked to accept trends data to rebut what it con-
tended was an anomalously high combined rating
at the time the assignment application was filed.
Duke Radio Broadcasting, Inc. ("Duke") was the li-
censee of KFIN(FM) in Jonesboro, Arkansas, and
sought to purchase from Patteson Brothers, Inc.
KBTM(AM) and KJBR-FM, both licensed to
Jonesboro." 6
Although the combined share for the three stations
was 34.19%, thus exceeding the cap by over nine
percentage points, Duke argued that this should not
preclude a grant of the application for two reasons.
First, although Jonesboro was a "large market"
under section 73.3555(a)(1)(ii) because more than
fifteen commercial signals actually overlapped with
the subject stations, only eleven of those signals were
"listenable" in Jonesboro, and others should not be
counted because they were Memphis stations. With
this qualification, the market would be considered a
"small" one, and no audience ratings data would be
necessary; the application could be granted because
the proposed three-station combination was less than
50% of the stations in the "market." ' 7 Second, Duke
contended that the 34.19% audience share for the
three-station combination was an aberration. 1 It
submitted county data for the three subject stations
for the past six years, which averaged 23.4%, signifi-
cantly less than the 34.19%, and enough to refute
any presumption of excessive concentration of
control.' 9
The staff referred the matter to the Commission
in order to obtain, inter alia, a definitive announce-
ment on the acceptability of alternative trends data
instead of only the most recent ratings available.
The Commission rejected Duke's attempt to clas-
sify Jonesboro, Arkansas as a "small market," stat-
the staff perceives to be a remedial policy of assisting the com-
mercial radio industry.
"" In Re Application of Patteson Brothers, Inc., Assignor,
and Duke Radio Broadcasting, Inc., Assignee, for Assignment of
License of KBTM(AM)/KJBR-FM Jonesboro, Arkansas, 8
FCC Rcd. 7595 (1993) [hereinafter Patteson Brothers].
11I Id. paras. 1-2.
"1 Id. para. 4.
1 Id. para. 4. Jonesboro was not in an Arbitron-rated mar-
ket. The audience data submitted was thus the total of all coun-
ties in which the principal community contour of any of the sub-
ject stations intersected in whole or in part, as weighted by
population. Id.
1I Id. Although the six-year average was below 25%, the
Commission noted that the preceding year's county data also ex-
ceeded the 25% limit. Id. para. 9.
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ing that it found no basis on which to accept the al-
ternative method of defining the market. The
Commission pointed out that it had already rejected
alternative methods of defining the market in its Re-
consideration Order.
In this regard, we determined that the contour overlap
standard addresses our core concerns of diversity and com-
petition while reflecting actual options available to listen-
ers and market conditions facing the particular stations in
question... . We have previously concluded that this stan-
dard for market definition is likely to be conservative be-
cause listeners in rural areas where there are few operat-
ing stations, and thus low levels of daytime interference,
may be able to receive signals beyond the predicted princi-
pal community contour .... Duke offers no evidence suffi-
cient to demonstrate that our conclusion in this regard in
inaccurate or otherwise unjustified."'
As to Duke's alternative data submission, the
Commission specifically stated that the presumption
of excessive concentration of control derived from the
25% limit "cannot be overcome by trend data that
demonstrates an average combined audience share of
less than 25%, unless it is first shown how that trend
data overcomes a statistical anomaly in the current
ratings provided by Arbitron."''
As to what sort of anomaly the Commission had
in mind, it stated that general criticisms of Arbitron's
sampling techniques would not be sufficient in the
absence of a showing that the purported flaws ad-
versely affected the particular group ratings survey
period in question more than other survey periods.
In brief, the Commission specifically rejected a pro-
position generally-accepted in statistical theory, that
data averaged over a longer period of time is likely
to be more accurate than data from a single sam-
pling period. 2 Pragmatically speaking, by placing
the burden on the proponent to demonstrate why
trends data is more accurate than that from the spe-
cific single ratings period, the Commission has effec-
tively foreclosed the use of trends data as an alterna-
tive in duopoly cases.
Although the Commission refused to grant the ap-
plication, or grant Duke a permanent waiver of 47
C.F.R. § 73.3555(a)(1), the Commission was per-
suaded to grant Duke a limited, one year waiver in
120 Id. para. 6.
121 Id. para. 9.
122 Id. "In other words, a large sample is more reliable than
a small sample." F.H. Zuwaylif, GENERAL APPLIED STATIS-
TICS 120 (Addison-Wesley Pub. Co. 1970).
122 Patteson Brothers, supra note 115, paras. 14-17.
124 Id. at 7598 (statement of Comm'r Andrew C. Barrett).
126 Applications of WANV, Inc., and High Fidelity Music
Show, Inc., for Consent to Assignment of Broadcast Station, in
which to divest itself of one of the two FM stations.
The Commission noted that the stations would be
operated separately during the one-year period and
that each station would have its own independent
sales, programming and operating staffs. The Com-
mission cautioned that no further waiver requests
would be entertained, but said nothing about the
possibility that during the one-year waiver period,
the ratings might drop back below 25%, which could
make the transaction eligible for grant. 2 ' Commis-
sioner Barrett, who issued a separate statement, pre-
sumably would not have permitted such reconsidera-
tion, since he stated that he wanted to subject the
station to a distress sale if it had not been sold within
the year's time.1
24
D. The Case of the Disappearing
Staunton-Waynesboro, Virginia
Market:
On January 29, 1993, simultaneous applications
were filed asking for consent to the assignment of li-
censes of WANV(AM), in Waynesboro, Virginia
from WANV, Inc., and WANV-FM, in Staunton,
Virginia, from High Fidelity Music Show, Inc., to
WANV-LP, the proposed assignee. 2 The general
partner of WANV-LP, Clark Broadcasting Com-
pany ("Clark"), already held the licenses of WKDW
(AM) and WKDW-FM, in Staunton, Virginia. Be-
cause these ownership interests were fully attributa-
ble under the Commission's ownership attribution
policies, 2 " WANV-LP submitted a duopoly showing
with its application. The showing demonstrated that
there were twenty-seven commercial radio stations
with overlapping principal city contours in the com-
posite coverage area of the four stations, and that the
combined audience share for the four stations using
the Arbitron spring 1992 county-by-county ratings
data, was 13%.127
Within the thirty-day public comment period, two
petitions to deny the applications were filed by com-
petitors in the market. Slocumedia, Inc., Licensee
and Assignor of WAYB(AM), in Waynesboro, Vir-
ginia, and Hometown Media, Inc. ("Hometown"),
its proposed assignee, filed a joint petition,' 28 and M.
File Nos. BAL-930129EB and BALH-930129GF (Nov. 30,
1993) [hereinafter WANV, Inc., Application]. WANV, Inc. and
High Fidelity Music Show, Inc. were under common ownership.
1 26 See generally 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (1993), NoTFs 1-10
following text of rule.
127 WANV, Inc., Application, supra note 125. The Arbitron
Spring 1992 Report stated that the ratings were based on data
collected in the field in the fall of 1991.
128 Id.; Joint Petition to Deny of Slocumedia, Inc., and
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Belmont VerStandig, Inc., licensee of WSVA(AM),
and WQPO-FM, in Harrisonburg, Virginia (a com-
munity located north of Staunton) also filed a peti-
tion to deny." 9
Both of the petitioners objected to WANV-LP's
use of Arbitron county ratings for determining the
four stations' combined audience share. They argued
that section 73.3555(a)(3) of the rules require that
where the majority of contour overlap between the
stations takes place in a radio metro market or
equivalent, the combined audience share is the ag-
gregate listening share within the metro.' 80
At one time, Staunton-Waynesboro had been an
Arbitron-rated metro market; however, Arbitron
ceased publishing separate ratings for that market in
1989, solely because, according to the petitioners,
Arbitron did not receive enough subscriptions for its
Staunton-Waynesboro Report to warrant publishing
separate ratings for that market. A competing ratings
service, Birch Audience Ratings Service, continued to
publish ratings for the Staunton-Waynesboro market
for two more years, but went out of business in
1991.131
The petitioners argued that because both Arbitron
and Birch previously had defined Staunton-Waynes-
boro as a rated market, and because the spring 1991
Birch survey had shown that Clark's existing AM-
FM combination, WKDW AM-FM, already had a
combined share that exceeded 25%, the proposed ac-
quisition should not be approved. To reinforce this
argument, the petitioners noted that the entire area
of overlap of the four stations occurred in Augusta
county, where the four stations had a combined
share of 35%,1"2 (citing to section 73.3555(a)(3)(iii),
which provides that where the proposed commonly-
owned stations serve more than one radio market,
the market where the majority of overlap occurs
should be used in determining audience ratings).'
Further, the petitioners argued, it was arbitrary and
contrary to the rule for WANV-LP to use audience
ratings from adjacent Rockingham county and the
city of Harrisonburg, because only a small percent-
Hometown Media, Inc. (petition date Mar. 12, 1993) [hereinaf-
ter Slocumedia/Hometown Petition].
19 WANV, Inc., Application, supra note 125; Petition to
Deny of M. Belmont VerStandig, Inc. (petition date March 12,
1993) [hereinafter VerStandig Petition].
20 Slocumedia/Hometown Petition, supra note 128, at 10;
VerSiandig Petition, supra note 129, at 13.
121 Slocumedia/Hometown Petition, supra note 128, at 10;
VerStandig Petition, supra note 129, at 12.
12 Slocumedia/Hometown Petition, supra note 128, at 6;
VerStandig Petition, supra note 129, at 13.
128 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (1993).
age of the principal city contours of the stations to be
acquired extended into those adjacent areas, with the
vast majority of the four stations serving only
Staunton and Augusta county. To permit the combi-
nation, argued the petitioners, would allow Clark to
"pit four local radio stations against an AM-FM
combination (WTON(AM) and WTON-FM) and
one stand-alone (WSKO) in a radio market
(Staunton-Waynesboro and Augusta county) with a
population of 97,687."'" This, argued the petition-
ers, was contrary to the policy behind the revised ra-
dio ownership rules.
In a consolidated opposition, WANV-LP argued
that it had abided precisely by the rules, which pro-
vided that where a metro market does not exist, au-
dience share figures should be used for all counties
that are within the principal community contours of
one or more the stations in question, in whole or in
part. 8' WANV-LP pointed out that Arbitron had
not published data for the Staunton-Waynesboro
market since 1989, and that the Birch 1991 data was
outdated and therefore not the most recent audience
survey data available,3 6 as required by the rules and
as clarified in Franklin Communications. WANV-
LP also disputed that lack of subscribers was the
only reason that Arbitron ceased designating
Staunton-Waynesboro as a metro market; there are
nine other factors that are considered by Arbitron in
designating certain population groupings as a sepa-
rate radio market, none of which related to sub-
scriber levels.' WANV-LP concluded by accusing
the petitioners of attempting to rewrite the multiple
ownership rules, long after the time when it was
permissible to seek review or reconsideration of those
rules.' 38
In reply, Slocumedia, and Hometown repeated
their previous arguments and argued that the Birch
data was not outdated. They pointed out that Clark
was still using the Birch data to promote its own two
stations in selling local and national advertising. If
current enough for sales purposes, it should be
deemed current enough for the duopoly rule."'
"24 Slocumedia/Hometown Petition, supra note 128, at 10-
12.
'" WANV, Inc., Application, supra note 125; Consolidated
Opposition to Petition to Deny of WANV-LP 9 (opposition date
Mar. 25, 1993) [hereinafter WANV-LP Opposition].
182 WANV-LP Opposition, supra note 135, at 5-6.
17 Id. Ex. A at 2.
1ss Id. at 11-12.
139 WANV, Inc., Application, supra note 125; Reply of
Slocumedia, Inc., and Hometown Media, Inc., 6-8 (reply date




After the first round of pleadings, WANV-LP
filed an amendment to its application to include data
from an Arbitron Radio Custom Survey Area Report
("CSAR"), which was a compilation of data col-
lected in the spring of 1992 for Augusta county,
showing a combined share of 20.7%. WANV-LP ar-
gued that if the Commission believed that only audi-
ence ratings from Augusta county should be used,
the most recent data available placed them under the
25% cap. This started a second round of pleadings.
Slocumedia and Hometown filed a consolidated fur-
ther reply challenging the validity of the CSAR sub-
mitted by WANV-LP because there were not
enough tabulated diaries, that Clark was aware of
this, and had instructed its own former general sales
manager (who had since defected and provided affi-
davits to the petitioners) not to use the CSAR in
sales presentations without first disclosing that
fact.1
40
WANV-LP responded by defending the methodol-
ogy used by Arbitron in its CSAR as the standard
one used in all Arbitron surveys, and that it was
submitted to provide the Commission with the most
up-to-date information on audience share in Augusta
county. The declaration of the general manager of
Clark's two Staunton stations stated that he and the
former general sales manager had investigated the
reliability of the CSAR, and after several discussions
with Arbitron, determined that it was reliable.
1 41
In a final shot, the petitioners, in a joint reply,
offered a new attack on the reliability of the CSAR
by pointing out that during the survey period in
question, one of the four stations changed call letters
and program format, implying that this was done in-
tentionally to manipulate the ratings (in this case,
downward). Further, they again questioned why the
Birch data (which showed a much higher combined
share) was still being used by Clark as a marketing
tool and not the newer data from the CSAR.
14 2
The Commission's staff, after ten months, finally
acted to grant the WANV applications and rejected
the petitions to deny. With regard to the Birch 1991
Report, the staff said that they "d[id] not believe
[they] should give greater weight to data and market
definitions generated from a defunct organization
that no longer has a continuing collection and publi-
cation capability when data have been submitted
14 Letter from Larry D. Eads, Chief, Audio Services Divi-.
sion, FCC, to John S. Logan, Esq. 5 (Nov. 30, 1993) (1800B3-
JB/LLS) [hereinafter Letter from Larry D. Eads to John S.
Logan].
141 Id. at 5-6.
142 Id. at 6.
from a recognized, reliable and accessible continuing
source."
148
With respect to whether data from the Staunton-
Waynesboro area should be used rather than the
county-by-county data, the staff resolved the matter
without investigating why Arbitron no longer desig-
nated the area as a metro market while Birch contin-
ued to do so until it went out of business. Instead,
the staff stated that because the only rating service
still providing audience survey data for the area in
question did not designate any of the area as a metro
market, greater weight should be afforded to the data
and methodology provided by the only company con-
tinuing to collect and publish audience share infor-
mation. Such a policy was justified, the staff said,
because the Commission may need to rely on such
data in future cases involving the area stations. The
continuing availability and wide accessibility of such
data warrants the conclusion that it should be relied
on as the most probative evidence available as to the
applicants' compliance with the FCC's audience
share requirements.
144
With regard to the dispute over whether data only
from Augusta county, or from all counties touched
by the principal community contours of the four sub-
ject stations should be presented, the staff stated that
the rule was quite clear that county data was to be
used, and that the Report and Order provided a
clear and unambiguous methodology for weighting
the shares from each county where the contours cov-
ered in whole or in part. For the petitioners to chal-
lenge such a methodology was tantamount to seeking
reconsideration of the rules, an action inappropriate
to an adjudicated case. "
Having ruled that the most reliable and appropri-
ate data available at the time of filing of the applica-
tion was the general spring 1992 county-by-county
data reported by Arbitron, the staff did not address
the compiled CSAR Augusta county data submitted
by WANV-LP in its amendment. Presumably, had
the decision been otherwise, the CSAR Augusta
county data would still not have been considered un-
less it had been available at the time of filing. " O
IV. CONCLUSION
After more than a year's experience with the re-
143 Id. at 7.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 7-8.
146 Such a ruling would appear to be mandated by both
Franklin Communications MO&O, supra note 74, and Patteson
Brothers, supra note 115.
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laxed duopoly rules for radio, certain inferences can
be drawn about how the rules are being applied, and
whether they are having any impact on the radio
industry.
A. Effect of the FCC Rulings
From the four case studies analyzed above, several
conclusions can be drawn. The first conclusion is
that almost all of the consolidations under the rules
are taking place in "large" markets, as that term is
defined under the rules. One suspects that the Com-
mission had little idea of what the impact would be
of its definition of "small" versus "large" markets.
In the Reconsideration Order, the Commission re-
treated. from the primary use of Arbitron-defined
markets and made the contour-overlap method appli-
cable in all cases as a means of defining the relevant
radio market.14 As a result, the boundaries of the
market usually were expanded to encompass areas
well outside the Arbitron metro market. This was
true in each of the four case studies analyzed, and
made a critical difference in the Staunton-Waynes-
boro case.
Except in extremely remote areas, or where un-
usual geographical features exist,' 8 there are very
few small markets. Almost all markets have fifteen
or more principal community signals overlapping,
and what is more surprising, markets that were
thought to be "small" in terms of population, may
have as many as thirty or more such signals. Quite
apart from competing media, such as television,
cable, print, and compact disks, radio broadcasters
are discovering how "over-radioed" their markets re-
ally are.
The mismatch of the radio contour overlap
method with the Arbitron MSA method for defining
large markets, however, can preclude some combina-
tions which might otherwise be permissible. But for
the fact that Arbitron discontinued rating the
Staunton-Waynesboro market as a separate MSA,
the duopoly proposed by WANV-LP would not have
been permitted. Similarly, the duopoly proposed by
Clear Channel was found acceptable only because of
the fortuitous drop in the Richmond MSA combined
4' Radio Rules and Policies Reconsideration Order, supra
note 45, para. 39.
148 For example, Arbitron has designated Roanoke-Lynch-
burg, Virginia, as a single radio market (#97). BROADCASTING
AND CABLE YEARBOOK, 1993, B-584. Yet, a number of. the ra-
dio stations licensed to Lynchburg do not place a principal com-
munity contour over Roanoke, nor do their contours overlap
with those of a number of Roanoke stations. The reason is inter-
audience share for the particular quarter in which
the application was filed. What may be regarded by
some as anomalous results will continue to occur in
large market cases because of this two-step
definition.
A second conclusion that can be drawn is that the
staff and the Commission intend to adhere to a
"bright line" rule with respect to audience ratings.
Both the Charleston, West Virginia, and Richmond,
Virginia cases demonstrate how the fates and for-
tunes of radio stations change from season to season
with respect to audience ratings. What may be per-
missible in the first quarter of 1994 may not be per-
missible if the same application is filed in the second
quarter. Yet the Commission, for the sake of admin-
istrative expediency and in fairness to applicants at-
tempting to comply with the new rules, has refused
to take the volatile nature of audience ratings into
account in administering the rule. Despite paying lip
service in the rule to the fact that anomalous situa-
tions can occur justifying the use of alternative data,
including trends data, the Commission has thus far
refused to accept any alternative means of assessing
audience share in large radio markets. One suspects
that the burden upon an applicant or objector seek-
ing to submit alternative data will be so great that
the rule effectively may be read to exclude the use of
any such data, despite the Commission's specific ac-
knowledgement of, and provision for, its use in the
new rules.' 9
B. Impact on the Industry
With more than eighteen months since the adop-
tion of the new duopoly rules, some information on
their impact on the radio industry is now emerging.
Most of the information that has been collected thus
far, however, is anecdotal, and sometimes inconsis-
tent. In its Report and Order, the Commission di-
rected the Mass Media Bureau to prepare an annual
report to assess the effect of the revised rules on the
radio industry including their impact on competition,
diversity and minority ownership.'50 As a result of
more pressing business, including the implementa-
tion of the new cable television legislation,' 8 ' release
vening mountainous terrain between the two cities that limits the
possible overlap of signals to those of high-powered stations.
.. NOTE following 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(a)(1)(ii) (1993);
see also Radio Rules and Policies Reconsideration Order, supra
note 45, paras. 52, 55.
180 Radio Rules and Policies Report and Order, supra note
5, para. 68.
... Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition
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of the Bureau's first annual report, originally sched-
uled for the end of 1993, has been rescheduled
twice.152 Release of the report is not expected earlier
than the end of June 1994.153
Of the data presently available on radio mergers,
consolidations, and joint ventures, most of it has not
been collected by the FCC, but by the industry trade
press.' 4 Radio Business Report ("RBR"), a weekly
newsletter focusing on radio economics, has prepared
a series of reports on the subject of radio duopolies.
As of November 22, 1993, RBR found that a total of
1,393 commercial radio stations -14% of the nation's
9,916 commercial radio stations-were involved in
duopoly combinations and/or local marketing agree-
ment arrangements."' The largest number of sta-
tions (380), as well as the largest increase between
September and November, 1993 ( 74), were in the
top fifty radio markets. 56
Some of the information tends to suggest that at
least some stations are benefitting from the new
rules. A November 22, 1993 article in Broadcasting
& Cable magazine, for example, reported that reve-
nues in the San Antonio market, where a significant
amount of duopoly restructuring had taken place,
were 20% ahead of 1992 levels.' Four owners,
Clear Channel Communications, Tichenor Media,
NewCity Communications and Rusk Corp., which
together held six stations in 1991, now own fifteen
stations out of a total of thirty-one stations in the
market. Whereas in 1991, the four top owners' six
stations had a 34.7% share and earned 55% of the
Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992).
15' See Duopoly Takes Back Seat to Cable at FCC, BROAD-
CASTING & CABLE, Nov. 8, 1993, at 41.
'5 Telephone interview with Stewart Bedell, Assistant
Chief, Audio Services Division, Mass Media Bureau, FCC
(Mar. 8, 1994).
'" The Mass Media Bureau staff advises that approxi-
mately 600 applications for approval of proposed duopolies have
been filed as of March 1, 1994. Of these, all but 140 have been
acted on. Id. Mr. Bedell indicated that the Bureau would be re-
lying extensively on data collected by private industry in the
preparation of its own report. Id.
15 Duopoly Special Report, Part 1, RADIO Bus. REP., Nov.
29, 1993, at 8.
15 Id. In a follow-up report the following week, Radio Bus-
iness Report listed all of the duopoly-LMA combinations in each
of the top fifty markets. Duopoly Special, Part 2, RADIO Bus.
REP., Dec. 6, 1993, at 8-9. A list of the duopoly and LMA deals
in the next fifty markets (Nos. 51-100) was published the fol-
lowing week in Part 3: Duopoly Special, Part 3, RADIO Bus.
REP., Dec. 13, 1993, at 8-9.
157 Consolidation Comes to San Antonio, BROADCASTING &
CABLE, Nov. 22, 1993, at 35.
"' Id.; See Duopolies Growing in Revenue Share, BROAD-
CASTING & CABLE, Mar. 21, 1994, at 48.
market revenues, by the third quarter of 1993, the
combined audience share of the fifteen stations was
62.1% and an estimated 77.9% of the market
revenue.1
5 8
A more comprehensive study was undertaken by
Jim Duncan, publisher of American Radio, who
studied 147 markets surveyed by Arbitron in the fall
of 1993. One hundred and seventeen of those 147
markets had one or more duopolies in place, with the
fastest increase in duopolies in markets numbered 25
to 75.159 Of greatest significance was the fact that in
all markets studied the percentage of market reve-
nues controlled by duopolies exceeded the percentage
of 12+ AQH audience shares. For example, the
three markets where Duncan found that duopolies
controlled the greatest shares of audience, Richmond,
Virginia,60  Albuquerque, New Mexico,'"' and
Rochester, New York,162 also had a much larger
percentage of the radio advertising revenues in those
markets."'
The above analysis suggests that those stations
which have taken advantage of the Commission's re-
laxed local ownership rules have been strengthened
economically as a result, and the Commission's
stated goal would appear to be on the way to being
realized. Without further analysis of the players,
however, it cannot be concluded that the radio indus-
try as a whole is benefitting by the new policy. Is the
policy benefitting only the large group owners, as
Commissioner Barrett warned in his partial dissent
to the Report and Order?'" Is the disparity between
1" Special Report: Duncan on Duopoly, RADIO Bus. REP.,
Feb. 21, 1994, at 6. Duncan pointed out that these were the
same markets that had experienced the greatest proliferation of
new or "moved-in" FM channels. Id.
0 Four duopolies composed of 12 stations had 68.7% of the
audience. Duopoly Special, Part 3, supra note 156, at 8; Special
Report: Duncan on Duopoly, supra note 159, at 6.
101 Four duopolies involving 14 stations had 62.1% of the
audience. Duopoly Special, Part 3, supra note 156, at 8; Special
Report: Duncan on Duopoly, supra note 159, at 6.
... Five duopolies comprised of 16 stations had 59.1% of the
audience. Duopoly Special, Part 3, supra note 156, at 8; Special
Report: Duncan on Duopoly, supra note 159, at 6.
1'" The four duopolies in the Richmond, Virginia metro
controlled 83.5% of the revenues; The Rochester, New York du-
opolies controlled 79.9% of the revenues; and the Albuquerque
duopolies controlled 79.2% of the revenues. Special Report:
Duncan on Duopoly, supra note 159, at 6.
164 Radio Rules and Policies Report and Order, supra note
5, at 70, Rad. Reg. 2d at 928 (Comm'r Barrett dissenting in part
and concurring in part). Attached to Commissioner Barrett's
opinion was an appendix illustrating how, under the Commis-
sion's initial local ownership rule changes, six or seven group
owners could own all of the stations in the top 10 markets with-
out exceeding the 25% audience share limits. Id. Apps. 5, 6.
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rich and poor stations only increasing, not
decreasing?
Views on the impact of the duopoly rules are not
consistent either as to the nature of the impact or
whether they are beneficial or detrimental to the in-
dustry as a whole. Interviews with persons in the in-
dustry as reported in the trade press have been
mixed. Some persons interviewed believed that duop-
olies were primarily responsible for enhanced reve-
nue growth: the economies of scale of combined op-
erations, they said, helped those stations bring more
revenue to the bottom line. Others contended that
revenue growth was more a factor of improved eco-
nomic conditions in the market generally, or pointed
to the fact that gains in cash flow were most often
achieved by reduction in the labor force of a com-
bined operation, particularly of upper level manage-
ment positions. 1
Most observers have agreed that a new combina-
tion created under the duopoly rules almost always is
accompanied by cost-cutting and trimming of ex-
penses to make the operation more efficient. One
group owner's experience is that the positions of
general manager, chief engineer, promotions director
and business manager are most often consolidated
when a duopoly is formed." Obviously, savings also
can come from operating out of one building rather
than two, having consolidated payrolls, and splitting
other general and administrative costs. 6 ' Less fre-
quent is the consolidation of the sales departments or
sales managers of newly-combined stations. The
president of NewCity Communications, which has
duopolies or LMAs in four of its six markets, ob-
serves that even though each salesperson had fewer
accounts, they are representing three or four stations
instead of one or two, and can spend more time with
that account, and make a higher sale as a result.
Consolidation, and its attendant cost-cutting mea-
lob Id.; see also, Peter Viles, For Some, Duopoly Means a
Pink Slip, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Nov. 15, 1993, at 74.
166 Reports from the Trenches, Interview with Ed Christian,
President and CEO of Saga Communications, RADIO Bus. REP.,
Nov. 29, 1993, at 9.
187 Id. Christian stressed however, that Saga had to guard
against unreasonable expectations of cost expectations. 40% to
50% was found to be highly inflated. Experience taught that a
20% savings in operating costs was a more realistic expectation.
Id.
10 FCC radio industry employment figures are not yet
available for 1993, but the trend has been downward since 1989.
This trend cannot be blamed on duopolies, however, since the
rule only went into effect on September 16, 1992. However,
while national advertising statistics point to a significant (8%-
9%) increase in radio revenues, statistics for the same period for
sures by necessity has brought with it an overall re-
duction in employment in the industry, but its im-
pact on the industry, except perhaps in very specific
job categories, has not yet been established." 8 More-
over, there is thus far no evidence to suggest that
there is a corresponding decline in the quality of
broadcast service, or even any decline at all. Accord-
ing to one general manager who was "duopolized,"
the people who are being cut are most often those
who do not have the best creativity or skills: "It
works out well for the good employees. It's the 'B'
players and the 'C' players who are going to get
shuffled down .... The effect will be positive for the
industry." '16 In addition, the economic strengthening
brought about by consolidation may be increasing
both program "diversity" as well as quality.
17 0
C. Future Trends in Duopolization
It is always risky to venture predictions about the
future impact of a regulatory scheme or any piece of
legislation; however, based upon the data collected
thus far, certain trends can be foreseen.
First, we can expect consolidations to continue
over the next two years, at a gradually declining
pace. These consolidations will take place mostly in
the top 75 markets, but spreading downward to
Markets 100-150. As pointed out by Duncan, radio
markets 25 through 75 were hardest hit during the
1980s with the proliferation of new and moved-in
FM channels,1 71 and thus, may continue to experi-
ence the greatest amount of duopolization.
Second, local marketing agreements will continue
to be utilized in at least three different ways. Some
licensees will use the LMA as an initial stage before
consolidation, for the time period between comple-
tion of contract negotiations and consummation of
certain job categories in radio continued to show a decline. For
example, the number of stations employing chief engineers de-
clined from 84% in 1992 to 78.1% in 1993, and the percentage
employing news directors dropped from 72.3% to 66.7%. Viles,
supra note 165, at 76.
169 Id. (quoting Bill Sherard, former general manager of
WCPT (AM)-WCXR (FM) in the Washington, D.C. market).
170 As pointed out by Dick Ferguson, President of NewCity
Communications: "We've created diversity-more choices for the
listeners. These [NewCity's recently consolidated] stations could
not be operating at these quality levels if it hadn't been for du-
opoly. And don't forget, both Birmingham and San Antonio
were in bankruptcy before we stepped in." Reports from the
Trenches, supra note 166, at 9.




the deal after FCC approval has been obtained.172
LMAs also will be used by those licensees who can-
not acquire a second station outright, either because
of the 25% audience share cap,' or because of the
one-to-a-market rule,1 4 might still operate a second
radio station in the market through a local market-
ing agreement without being in violation of 47
C.F.R. § 73.3555(c) or (d). Finally non-program-
ming LMA's (e.g., joint sales agreements, joint sales
and operating agreements where the licensee contin-
ues to program its station) will be used by those op-
erators to "lock-in" a future acquisition now prohib-
ited under the rules, in anticipation that the FCC
will further relax the multiple ownership rules to
permit "triopolies" of AM and FM stations-at
least in larger markets-as it originally had done in
the initial Report and Order."5
Third, duopolization will likely be used most by
two types of groups: "national" group owners, who
will use duopolies to establish a competitive presence
in various major (top 25) markets throughout the
country as part of an overall national strategy,'
76
and "regional" group owners, who use duopolies to
build a regional chain of stations in smaller
17' Duopoly Special Report, Part 1, supra note 155, at 8.
178 In adopting the LMA attribution policy in the new rules,
the Commission did not require the termination of existing local
marketing agreements which were not in compliance. Thus,
Bristol Broadcasting Company, Inc., the petitioner in the
Charleston, West Virginia case, had a grandfathered LMA with
another station in the market which could not be converted to
the high audience share enjoyed by Bristol. See supra note 78
and accompanying text.
'74 Although section 73.3555 counts time brokered stations
as "owned" by the time brokering station for purposes of com-
pliance with the national and local radio ownership rules, they
are not counted as an attributable interest with respect to com-
pliance with the newspaper or one-to-a-market rule.
i7' Radio Rules and Policies Report and Order, supra note
5, para. 40. As of this writing, there appears to be some move-
ment in Congress and the Commission for reexamining the
broadcast multiple ownership rules, in light of expansive plans
for the "Information Superhighway." Radio Ownership Restric-
tions May Be Relaxed, SMALL MARKET RADIO NEWSLErTER,
Mar. 17, 1994, at 1; see also Relaxed Radio, TV Ownership
Limits in the Cards; House, Senate May Direct FCC Rule Re-
view, RADIO Bus. REP., Mar. 7, 1994, at 4.
170 Infinity Broadcasting Corporation is the most successful
example of a "national" group duopolist. It has duopoly combi-
nations in the following top 10 markets: New York (#1), Los
Angeles (#2), Chicago (#3), Washington, D.C. (#7), and Bos-
ton (#9). Duopoly Special, Part 2, supra note 156, at 8.
markets.
1 77
Fourth, while continued consolidation will also
bring about more competitive combinations, the abil-
ity of a single owner to "dominate" a market may
actually become more difficult. As pointed out by
Duncan, in only 14 of the 147 markets surveyed did
a single duopoly owner control more than 25% of the
audience. 78 While this is partly due to the fact that
all duopolies are relatively "new," and thus have
had insufficient time to build greater audience
shares, it is also true that in most radio markets
there is more than one duopoly, and the increased
competition between them keeps one or the other
from becoming overly dominant.'
7 '
Finally, as the rules and policies governing duopo-
lies become more clear, there will be fewer "wars"
fought at the FCC between competitors, and more
fought "in the trenches," as recombined groups seek
to improve their competitive position in the market-
place. The public can only benefit from these newer
"duopoly wars," and one would hope that the FCC
will conclude that the more ephemeral public inter-
est will also be served.
177 Virginia Network, Inc. is a good example of a group in
the process of building a strong regional network, with a seven
station combination of owned and time-brokered stations in the
Roanoke-Lynchburg market (#97). Duopoly Special, Part 3,
supra note 156, at 9. Similarly, West Virginia Radio Corpora-
tion has supplemented its West Virginia news and sports radio
network with duopolies in Morgantown-Clarksburg and
Charleston, West Virginia. Id.; see also discussion of the
Charleston, West Virginia case, supra notes 74-103 and accom-
panying text.
178 Special Report: Duncan on Duopoly, supra note 159, at
6. However, Duncan found that in 51 markets a single duopoly
controlled more than 25% of the revenue. Id. One suspects that
if the kind of revenue were analyzed, the majority would be rev-
enue from regional and national advertising, and not local adver-
tising. National advertisers tend to buy exclusively on the basis
of audience share (cost per point), whereas local advertisers are
more interested in targeting their product or service to particular
audiences, to merchandising, and ultimately to "results"-
whether the ad campaign brings in customers and puts more
dollars in the cash register.
"' A minimum of two, and typically four, duopolies exist in
each of the top 50 markets. Duopoly Special, Part 2, supra note
156, at 8-9. At present, there are 20 singleton duopolies in mar-
kets 50-100, Duopoly Special, Part 3, supra note 156, at 8-9.
However; that number is likely to diminish in the near future,
since greater duopoly activity is now occurring in these markets.
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